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University of Dublin, Trinity College
When people think counterfactually about how a situation could have turned out differently, they
mentally undo events in regular ways (e.g., they focus on actions not failures to act). Four experiments
examine the recent discovery that the focus on actions in the short term switches to inactions in the long
term. The experiments show that this temporal switch occurs only for particular sorts of situations.
Experiment 1 showed no temporal pattern to die agency effect when 112 participants judged emotional
impact and frequency of "if-only" thoughts from both short- and long-term perspectives for an invest-
ment scenario. Experiment 2 showed no temporal pattern when 190 participants considered a college
choice scenario with a good outcome. Experiment 3 showed no temporal pattern when 131 participants
considered an investment scenario even when the situation for the actor and nonactor was bad from the
outset. Experiment 4, with 113 participants, showed a focus on actions even when the investment loss
was equal for both the actor and nonactor. The implications of the results are discussed in terms of what
is explicitly available in the mental representation of actions and inactions.
Counterfactual thinking about how factual situations may have
been different occurs often in everyday thinking (e.g., Kahneman
& Miller, 1986). People spontaneously think about how an out-
come could have turned out differently, and they mentally undo
aspects of the events that led to it. Counterfactual thinking may
serve a preparatory function in helping people to establish the
causes of events and to learn from mistakes (e.g., Roese & Olson,
1995; Wells & Gavanski, 1989). It may also serve an affective
function in contributing to emotions such as regret, guilt, and hope
and attributions such as blame and responsibility (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1982; Roese, 1994, 1997). This type of thinking plays a
role in many aspects of cognition, including formulating counter-
examples to deductive conclusions (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne,
1991), deriving subgoals in problem solving (e.g., Ginsberg, 1986;
Keane, 1997), and intending to improve in creative discovery (e.g.,
Hofstadter, 1985).
When people think about how an outcome could have been
different, they mentally undo their representation of aspects of the
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factual situation in regular ways, perhaps corresponding to core
categories of mental life, such as causal, temporal, spatial, and
intentional categories (e.g., G. Miller & Johnson-Laird, 1976). For
example, they mentally undo the first cause in a causal sequence
rather than subsequent causes (e.g., Wells, Taylor, & Turtle, 1987),
but they mentally undo the most recent event in a noncausal,
temporal sequence rather than earlier events (e.g., Byrne, Segura,
Culhane, Tasso, & Berrocal, 2000; D. T. Miller & Gunesagaram,
1990; Spellman, 1997). They mentally undo events under a per-
son's voluntary control rather than events outside their control
(e.g., Girotto, Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991; McCloy & Byrne, in
press). Some research has indicated that they tend to judge that
people will feel worse about their actions rather than their failures
to act, perhaps because mentally undoing an event amplifies its
emotional impact (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Our aim was to
examine this last phenomenon: the tendency to judge that people
will feel worse about matters of commission rather than omission.
This agency effect, as we call it, seems a pervasive and potent
feature of everyday experience: It has been established in both
laboratory studies and everyday naturalistic situations (e.g., Gilo-
vich & Medvec, 1995a), and it may yield important insights into
the nature of the psychological mechanisms underlying cognitive
and emotional processes in counterfactual thinking.
The Agency Effect
Kahneman and Tversky (1982, p. 173) showed that reasoners
judge that actors will regret their actions more than nonactors will
regret their inactions. Ninety-two percent of participants in their
experiment believed that the individual who acted in the following
scenario, Mr. George, would feel greater regret:
Mr. Paul owns shares in company A. During die past year he consid-
ered switching to stock in company B, but he decided against it. He
now finds out that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he had
switched to the stock of company B. Mr. George owned shares in
company B. During the past year he switched to stock in company A.
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He now finds out that he would have been better off by $1,200 if he
had kept his stock in company B. Who feels greater regret?
Of course, the objective situation for each individual is entirely the
same, but people judge that their subjective situation is quite
different. Even when the order of the actions and inactions is
varied in the scenarios, people judge the action to be regretted
rather than the inaction; that is, people do not simply focus on the
more recently mentioned event (Gleicher et al., 1990). People
readily judge that an actor regrets actions and a nonactor regrets
inactions when these judgments are elicited separately, but when a
comparative judgment is required, they judge that it is the actor
who experiences more regret, at least when the actions and inac-
tions play a causal role in bringing about the negative outcome
(N'Gbala & Branscombe, 1997).
Although people judge that actions are more regretted than
failures to act in the short term, they judge that failures to act are
more regretted than actions in the long term (Gilovich & Medvec,
1994, 1995a). Gilovich and Medvec (1994, p. 360) demonstrated
this reversal of the agency effect, from a focus on actions to a focus
on inactions, with the following scenario:
Dave and Jim do not know each other, but both are enrolled at the
same elite East Coast university. Both are only moderately satisfied
where they are and bodi are considering transferring to another
prestigious school. Each agonizes over the decision, going back and
forth between thinking he is going to stay and thinking he will leave.
They ultimately make different decisions: Dave opts to stay where he
is, and Jim decides to transfer. Suppose their decisions turn out badly
for both of them: Dave still doesn't like it where he is and wishes he
had transferred, and Jim doesn't like his new environment and wishes
he had stayed.
In their experiment, 76% of participants who were asked the
question "Who do you think would regret his decision more upon
learning that it was a mistake?" thought that Jim, the individual
who had acted, would feel more regret. However, 63% of the
participants who were asked the question "Who do you think
would regret his decision more in the long run?" thought that
Dave, the individual who failed to act, would feel more regret.
Of course, judgments about the emotional experience of a fic-
tional character in a scenario are very different from genuinely
experienced emotions in a similar real-life situation. Scenario-
based emotion judgments may be based on inferential processes
and influenced by memory, perspective, suppositions, and so on.
Nonetheless, regrets for real-life actions and inactions appear to
increase the distress experienced in grief (e.g., Davis, Lehman,
Wortman, Silver, & Thompson, 1995; see also Dunning & Parpal,
1989). Moreover, people's real-life regrets for events recalled from
their own past lives do seem to follow a temporal pattern (Gilovich
& Medvec, 1994). When people are asked to recall events they
regret from their past, their regrets in the past week are evenly split
between actions and failures to act, but their regrets looking back
over their lives to that point are mainly regrets for what they failed
to do. They tend to say that they regret most failing to spend time
with their family and friends, failing to avail of educational op-
portunities, failing to pursue hobbies, and so on (Gilovich &
Medvec, 1994).
The temporal pattern to the experience of regret may result from
a variety of variables. Our aim in this article was to examine some
of the cognitive factors that mediate the agency effect. Gilovich
and Medvec (1994) proposed that cognitive variables that may
play a role include the following: (a) People remember regretted
inactions better than actions (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995a;
Savitsky, Medvec, & Gilovich, 1997), and (b) the consequences of
regretted inactions remain "open," that is, factually unknown. The
source of regret for actions may be their factual consequences,
whereas the source of regret for inactions may be their counter-
factual consequences, which are bounded only by the limits of the
imagination of what might have been (Gilovich & Medvec,
1995a). We examine this latter variable, the role of imagined
consequences, in the four experiments we report here.
Of course, other variables, including motivational and emotional
variables, may also be important. Gilovich and Medvec (1994)
proposed that seven variables are crucial in the agency effect: the
two cognitive variables outlined earlier and five motivational
variables that might reduce regret for action with time: (a) People
try to compensate for bad outcomes from actions by trying to set
them right; (b) they try mentally to look for "silver linings" to bad
outcomes from actions; (c) They try mentally to reduce dissonance
arising from actions, and that might increase regret for inaction
with time; (d) people find inactions inexplicable in the light of
retrospective confidence about the success of action; and (e) peo-
ple find it difficult to access the variables that inhibited action.
Emotional variables may include the possibility that short-term
regrets may be "hot," whereas long-term regrets are wistful
(Kahneman, 1995). In fact, people judge that regret for actions is
accompanied by anger, whereas regret for inactions is accompa-
nied by nostalgia or misery (Gilovich, Medvec, & Kahneman,
1998). We return to a consideration of such variables, after we
have considered the crucial cognitive processes underlying the
agency effect.
Real and Imagined Consequences
We suggest that the tendency to judge greater emotional impact
for actions may result from the way in which actions are mentally
represented. People may construct mental representations that
make some information explicit and leave other information im-
plicit, as suggested by studies of text comprehension (e.g.,
Garnham, 1985) and reasoning (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Byrne,
1991). Our first proposal is that actions may be represented more
explicitly—that is, by keeping in mind more information—than
inactions (e.g., Byrne & McEleney, 1997; Kahneman & Miller,
1986). Actions may be represented by keeping in mind the preac-
tion state (e.g., Jim in College A), and by also keeping in mind the
postaction state (e.g., Jim in College B). In contrast, inactions can
be represented by keeping in mind just a single state (e.g., Dave in
College A) because there has been no change in that state. This
cognitive difference may be the underlying root of the perception
that actions are a departure from the status quo (Kahneman &
Miller, 1986). Because of the greater amount of information kept
in mind about actions, they may be more readily available for
mutation in the generation of a counterfactual alternative (e.g., the
postaction state can be replaced with the past, now counterfactual,
preaction state to generate the thought, "If only Jim had stayed in
College A")- Our first key proposal is that actions are more readily
mutated because they are represented explicitly.1320 BYRNE AND McELENEY
Why then is there a reversal to a focus on inactions from a
long-term perspective? People can revise their mental representa-
tions of events to make implicit information explicit if need be.
They carry out such a revision when they realize that they have
represented insufficient information for the task at hand. When
they are given the task of judging who will feel worse about their
situation from a long-term perspective, they must consider the real
and imagined consequences of the events, because over time, it is
an event's consequences rather than the event itself that may
continue to have an impact (e.g., Shafir & Tversky, 1992). For the
actor, the consequences of each college choice are known (e.g.,
unhappiness for Jim in College A and even more unhappiness in
College B), but for the nonactor the consequences of one college
choice only are known (e.g., unhappiness for Dave in College A).
When people revise their mental representation of the events to
imagine the consequences of the other college choice (Dave in
College B), there are at least two possibilities (Dave could have
been happy or unhappy in College B), and one of them (Dave's
imagined happiness) is vastly better than the real consequences
(Dave's current unhappiness). When reasoners revise their mental
representations, they discover that the consequences of the men-
tally undone inaction are possibly good. In the counterfactual
situation, Dave might have been happy, whereas in the factual
situation, Dave is unhappy. Because the imagined consequences
are possibly good for Dave, they conclude that he feels worse (he
could have been happy had he acted differently) than Jim feels (he
would have been unhappy even if he had acted differently); and
because the consequences are possibly good for Dave, reasoners
focus on his inaction (more often than Jim's action) when they
generate a counterfactual alternative, say, in a sentence-completion
task (e.g., "If only Dave had transferred, he might have been
happy"). The college choice scenario provides unmatched infor-
mation about the action and the inaction: The factual consequences
of the action and the counterfactual consequences of the mentally
undone action are both known and the same (Jim was unhappy in
Colleges A and B). However, the factual consequences of the
inaction are known (Dave was unhappy in College A), but the
counterfactual consequences of the mentally undone inaction are
unknown and possibly better (Dave might have been happy in
College B). Therefore, our second key proposal is that inactions
are more readily mutated from the long-term perspective only
when their counterfactual consequences are possibly better than
their real consequences (and the action's counterfactual conse-
quences are not).
The college scenario is crucially different from the investment
scenario in this respect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman,
1987). In the investment scenario, the factual and counterfactual
consequences of the action and inaction are both known and
similar (e.g., Kahneman, 1995). For the actor, the factual and
counterfactual consequences for each investment choice arc
known (he is in Company B to start with and he transfers to
Company A; he loses money in Company A, which he would not
have lost in Company B); likewise, for the nonactor, the factual
and counterfactual outcomes for each investment choice are also
known (he is in Company A to start with and he stays in Company
A; he loses money in Company A, which he would not have lost
in Company B). Our central claim is that the temporal pattern to
the agency effect is confined to a special set of circumstances:
situations in which the imagined consequences from the mentally
undone action are the same as the real consequences from the
action, but the imagined consequences from the mentally undone
inaction are possibly better than the real consequences from the
inaction. From a long-term perspective, people consider the con-
sequences of actions and inactions, and the discrepancy between
them in the college scenario becomes apparent. The real conse-
quences of the inaction may seem worse and, so, are judged to be
regretted more than the real consequences of the action, compared
with the imaginary consequences. The actor can be judged to
consider the possibility "If I had stayed in College A, I would have
been unhappy," because it is factually known that when he was in
College A in the past, he was unhappy. In contrast the nonactor can
be judged to consider the possibility "If I had switched to College
B, I might have been happy or I might have been unhappy." The
counterfactual possibility of happiness makes the real outcome
seem worse for the nonactor than the actor. Of course, in the short
term, people concentrate on what they have explicitly represented
about the actions and inactions rather than their real or imaginary
consequences and so, the discrepancy is not apparent. In all other
situations, all things being equal, actions should be more mutable
regardless of temporal perspective. If our account is correct, then
the temporal reversal should not occur for the investment scenario.
However, perhaps the "open" nature of the college scenario—
that is, the fact that the imagined consequences of the mentally
undone inaction are unknown—is more similar to real-life situa-
tions (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995b)? After all, regret for inactions
in the long term has been demonstrated for people's regrets from
their own lives (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995a). In fact, experimental
evidence indicates that people characterize regrets for actions and
inactions from their own life more often as "closed" rather than as
open (Savitsky et al., 1997, Study 3). Savitsky and his colleagues
asked participants to describe their three biggest regrets of action
and three of inaction and to rate on a scale from closed book to
unfinished business the extent to which each regret was closed- or
open-ended. Participants considered 40% of their regrets to be
open and 59% to be closed. Hence, a closed scenario, such as the
investment one, has as much in common with natural regrets for
actions and inactions as an open scenario, such as the college one.
Overview of the Experiments
Here we report the results of four experiments in which we
examined our proposals that actions are more often mutated than
inactions except when the imagined consequences of the mentally
undone inaction are possibly better than the real consequences of
the inaction (and the imagined consequences of the mentally
undone action are the same as the real consequences of the action).
In Experiment 1, we tested the novel prediction derived from our
account that there should be no temporal reversal to the agency
effect for the investment scenario. In the investment scenario, the
imagined consequences of the mentally undone inaction are known
to be better than the real consequences of the inaction, and exactly
the same is true for the action: The amount and nature of the
information about the action and inaction are matched. In Exper-
iment 2, we tested the novel prediction that there should be no
temporal reversal to the agency effect for good outcomes even for
the college scenario. In a college scenario with a good outcome,
the imagined consequences of the mentally undone inaction are no
better than the real consequences of the inaction. The third exper-COUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 1321
iment pits our explanation of the temporal reversal against an
alternative based on differences in the initial states of the protag-
onists (which are neutral in the investment scenario but bad in the
college scenario). In Experiment 4, we tested our explanation
against an alternative that was based on differences in the subjec-
tive outcomes for the actor and the nonactor. The experiments
were guided by our two central proposals: (a) People mentally
undo actions because actions are represented more explicitly in
their minds, and (b) they switch to mentally undoing inactions only
in special circumstances (when the imagined consequences of the
mentally undone inaction are better than the real consequences of
the inaction, whereas the imagined and real consequences for the
action are the same).
Experiment 1: Temporal Perspectives on Bad Investments
The crucial differences between the college scenario and the
investment one are whether the counterfactual consequences of the
action and the inaction are both known and whether both differ
from the real consequences in similar ways. Given these differ-
ences, our aim in Experiment 1 was to examine whether people
mentally undo actions from a short-term perspective and inactions
from a long-term perspective for the investment scenario in which
the real and imagined consequences from the action and inaction
are matched or whether this temporal pattern is confined only to
scenarios of the college structure, in which the real and imagined
consequences from the action and inaction are not matched. We
gave participants investment scenarios from a short-term or a
long-term perspective, and we asked them to judge the emotional
impact of the outcome on the protagonists.
In addition, we asked the participants who would think "if only"
most and how they would complete this thought. The agency effect
has been established primarily through judgments of emotion, with
the assumption that emotions such as regret are cognitively deter-
mined emotions that are based on counterfactual mutability (e.g.,
Gilovich & Medvec, 1995a; Kahneman & Miller, 1986). The exact
nature of the link between emotional amplification and counter-
factual mutability has only recently begun to be studied for the
agency effect (e.g., N'Gbala & Branscombe, 1997). In our muta-
tion task, the frequency of participants' judgments that the actor or
the nonactor would think "if only" allowed us to probe subtly and
indirectly which person's actions or nonactions the participants
considered to be most mutable.
Method
Materials and design. We constructed a short-term and a long-term
version of a scenario based on Kahneman and Tversky' s (1982) investment
scenario. The short-term scenario was as follows (the information for the
long-term scenario is provided in parentheses; it was given to participants
in addition to the information for the short-teim scenario):
Paul saved hard and had £2,000 to Invest. He bought shares in
Company A. During his first year as a shareholder in Company A
there was a once-off offer to switch to shares in Company B, but he
decided against it. At the end of the first year he found out that he
would have been better off by £5,000 if he had taken the offer and
switched to shares in Company B. (After 10 years, he found out that
his shares did not make up the lost ground in the meantime, and he
would still have been better off by £5,000 if he had switched to shares
in Company B.)
Joe also saved hard and had £2,000 to invest. He bought shares in
Company B. During his first year as a shareholder in Company B
there was a once-off offer to switch to shares in Company A, and he
decided to do so. At the end of the first year he too found out that he
would have been better off by £5,000 if he had turned down the offer
and kept his shares in Company B. (After 10 years, he found out that
his shares did not make up the lost ground in the meantime, and he
would still have been better off by £5,000 if he had kept his shares in
Company B.)
The participants were asked three questions. In the short-term condition,
they were asked the following questions:
At the end of the First year of investment:
1. Who do you think would imagine "if only ..." most often at the end
of the first year of investment?
Please tick one: Paul Joe
2. How do you think he completed this thought?
3. Who do you think would feel worse about his decision at the end of
the first year of investment?
Please tick one: Paul Joe
The participants given the long-term scenario were asked the same ques-
tions but "at the end of the first year of investment" was replaced by
"after 10 years of investment." They were asked the three questions in the
fixed order given here. We gave the short-term scenario to one group of
participants and the long-term scenario to a second group.
Participants and procedure. The 120 participants were undergraduate
students from different departments in the University of Dublin, Trinity
College, Dublin, Ireland. The 98 women and 22 men, aged 17 to 54 years
(Af = 20 years), participated in the experiment voluntarily and were
assigned at random to two groups. Eight women were eliminated prior to
any data analysis because they failed to complete all three questions. The
remaining 112 participants completed alt three questions for either a
short-term or a long-term scenario (n = 56 in each). The participants were
tested in several groups and were presented with a booklet that contained
the instructions, the scenario and questions, and a debriefing paragraph,
each on separate pages. The participants worked at their own pace and
provided their answers in the spaces on the sheet.
Results and Discussion
The results showed that people judged greater emotional impact
and greater frequency of counterfactual thoughts for actions in the
short term and in the long term, when the counterfactual conse-
quences of the actions and inactions were both known and the
same. From the short-term perspective, 87.5% of the participants
judged that the actor, Joe, would feel worse, whereas 12.5%
judged that the nonactor, Paul, would feel worse, and the differ-
ence was reliable (binomial z = 5.61, p < .01). Likewise from the
long-term perspective, 86% of the participants judged that the
actor, Joe, would feel worse whereas 14% judged that the nonactor
Paul, would feel worse and the difference was reliable (binomial
z = 5.35, p < .01). There was no difference in the short-term and
long-term conditions in the judgments that the actor would feel
worse (87.5% vs. 86%, *
2(l,iV = 112) = 0.07,/> > .10, as Table
1 shows (and the comparison had sufficient power at the 80% level
to detect a difference of 18% or more).
Exactly the same pattern emerged for participants' judgments
about who would think "if only" most often. From the short-term
perspective, people judged that the actor Joe (71 %) would think "if
only" more often than the nonactor Paul (29%), and the difference
was reliable (binomial z = 3.21, p < .01). Likewise, from the1322 BYRNE AND McELENEY
Table 1
Percentage of Judgments of Who Feels Worse and Who Thinks
"If Only" Most Often for Actions and Inactions in the Short and
Long Terms for Investment Scenarios With Known Outcomes
Question
Who feels worse?
Action
Inaction
Who thinks "if only" most often?
Action
Inaction
n
Short term
87.5
12.5
71.0
29.0
56
Long term
86
14
64
36
56
long-term perspective, people judged that the actor Joe (64%)
would think "if only" more often than the nonactor Paul (36%),
and the difference was reliable (binomial z = 2.14, p < .01). There
was no difference in the short-term and long-term conditions in the
judgments that the actor would think "if only" most (71% vs.
64%), ^(1, N = 112) = 0.65, p > .10, as Table 1 shows (and the
comparison had sufficient power at the 80% level to detect a
difference of 25% or more).
People completed the counterfactual thought by undoing the
individual's action or inaction (depending on whether they focused
on the actor or the nonactor) in 80% of cases for the short-term
scenario, and the remaining 20% of mutations were general ones
(e.g., "I wish I'd taken a chance" or "I wish I had thought harder").
None of the undoings focused on the consequences (e.g., "I wish
I hadn't lost the money"). Likewise, from the long-term perspec-
tive, people completed the thought by undoing the individual's
action or inaction in 70% of cases, and the remaining 30% of
mutations were general (e.g., "I wish I hadn't been greedy" or "1
wish I had been more patient"). Once again, none of the undoings
focused on the consequences.
The results show that people do not mentally undo inactions
from a long-term perspective when their counterfactual conse-
quences are known and the same for both protagonists. Actions are
considered to have greater emotional impact and to generate
greater frequency of counterfactual thoughts than inactions from
both a long-term and a short-term perspective, when the counter-
factual consequences are known and the same for both the action
and the inaction. The results also show that judgments of who feels
worse and frequency of "if-only" thoughts follow the same pattern
as each other (N'Gbala & Branscombe, 1997). An increase in
counterfactual emotion has been assumed to correspond to an
increase in the mutability of an event (e.g., Kahneman & Miller,
1986; Roese & Olson, 1995), and our results are consistent with
this suggestion (of course, the within-participant design may have
amplified the internal consistency of participants' judgments in
this respect).
The results support our proposal that the focus on inactions in
the long term for the college scenario may depend on the relative
amount and nature of information available about the counterfac-
tual consequences of the action and inaction. It remains unknown
whether Dave, the nonactor, would have been happier if he had
moved to another college (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995b; Kahneman,
1995). The counterfactual consequences of some sorts of inactions,
such as whether a move to another college would have made a
person happier, are inherently unknowable (one individual's life,
as psychologists have long noted, has no control comparison); but
the counterfactual consequences of other sorts of inactions, such as
whether an investment in another company would have made a
profitable return, are entirely knowable. Inactions may have more
emotional impact than actions from a long-term perspective only
for the former sort of inactions, ones for which counterfactual
consequences are unknown and possibly better than the real
consequences.
One alternative possible explanation is that people may look for
silver linings from experiences that turn out badly (Gilovich &
Medvec, 1994), and the actor in the college scenario may appear to
gain more from his experience than the actor in the investment
scenario. The actor in the college scenario gains experience of two
colleges, and even though both result in unhappiness, the addi-
tional experience may be viewed as a bonus in the long term. The
nonactor gains experience of just one college and so may be
judged to have more to regret. Likewise, the actor in the invest-
ment scenario gains experience as a shareholder in two companies,
and the nonactor gains experience of just one company, but per-
haps the additional experience in the case for the actor may not
confer much compensatory experience. However, this alternative
possible explanation is not consistent with the results of the ex-
periment. If the reversal to a focus on inactions from the long-term
perspective in the college scenario resulted mainly from the avail-
ability of silver linings, then the investment scenario should lead to
an elimination of any agency effect, with the focus being equally
on actions and inactions, from the long-term perspective because
neither the actor nor the nonactor gained more than one another in
this regard. Instead, there was a robust focus on actions for the
investment scenario.
Experiment 1 showed that there is no temporal pattern to the
judgments of emotional impact and frequency of counterfactual
thoughts when the consequences of actions and inactions are both
known and similar. The temporal pattern to the agency effect—the
reversal from a focus on actions from a short-term perspective to
inactions from a long-term perspective—is confined to certain
sorts of scenarios, that is, scenarios in which the counterfactual
consequences for the nonactor are unknown and possibly better
than the real consequences.
Experiment 2: College Choices With Good Outcomes
The results of the first experiment supported our suggestion that
the temporal reversal to inactions occurs only when the counter-
factual consequences for the nonactor are unknown and possibly
better than the real consequences (Dave is unhappy in College A;
he might have been happy in College B) in contrast to the coun-
terfactual consequences for the actor that are known and the same
(Jim is unhappy in Colleges A and B). In some situations, the
counterfactual consequences for the nonactor may be unknown but
possibly worse than the real consequences (e.g., Dave is happy in
College A; he might have been unhappy in College B). By our
account, no reversal should occur in such situations, even though
the counterfactual consequences are unknown. The inaction will
not seem to have led to a worse outcome than the action (compared
with their counterfactual consequences), and so it will not be
focused on more. Recall that for the bad-outcome scenario, the
unhappy actor could be judged to consider "If I had stayed inCOUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 1323
College A, I would have been unhappy" (because he was unhappy
when he was there in the past), whereas the unhappy nonactor
could be judged to consider "If 1 had switched to College B, I
might have been happy or I might have been unhappy." Our
suggestion is that the counterfactual possibility of happiness makes
the real outcome (of unhappiness) seem worse for the nonactor
than the actor. For a good-outcome scenario the happy actor could
be judged to consider "If I had stayed in College A, I would have
been unhappy," whereas the happy nonactor could be judged to
consider "If I had switched to College B, I might have been happy
or I might have been unhappy." The counterfactual possibility of
happiness does not make the real outcome (of happiness) seem
worse for the nonactor than the actor. To test this proposal, we
examined college scenarios with good outcomes as well as bad
outcomes, from the short- and long-term perspective.
A focus on inactions, rather than actions, from a long-term
perspective has been observed experimentally only for the college
scenario, and in fact only a college scenario with a bad outcome
has been investigated (Gilovich & Medvec, 1994, 1995a). A focus
on actions in the short-term has been observed for scenarios with
either good or bad outcomes (Landman, 1987). For example,
people judge that actors will feel better about actions that lead to
good outcomes than nonactors will feel about inactions. Landman
demonstrated the emotional impact of actions for good outcomes
with a variety of scenarios, including the following:
Paul enrolled in Section 1 of Biology 101; his roommate enrolled in
Section 2. At the beginning of the term, Paul considered switching to
Section 2, but decided against it. The term is over and Paul just
learned that he got an A in ihe course. His roommate got a B. George
and his roommate enrolled in Section 2 of Biology 101. At the
beginning of the term, George switched to Section 1. The term is over
and George just learned that he got an A in the course. His roommate
got a B in Section 2. Who felt better about his section choice, Paul or
George?
Sixty-seven percent of participants judged that George, the indi-
vidual who acted, would feel better about his section choice than
Paul, the individual who did not act (Landman, 1987). Is there a
temporal pattern to the agency effect for good outcomes? The aim
of our second experiment was to address this question: We exam-
ined whether the temporal reversal of the agency effect for the
college scenario with a bad outcome would also be observed for a
college scenario with a good outcome. We also made sure that the
scenarios specified identical long-term outcomes for the actor and
the nonactor in the bad-outcome conditions to control for any
ambiguities in this feature in previous research.
Method
Materials and design. We constructed four scenarios on the basis of
fictional characters John and Paul and their college choices: a short-term,
bad-outcome version; a long-term, bad-outcome version; a short-term,
good-outcome version; and a long-term, good-outcome version. We con-
structed the four scenarios based on Gilovich and Medvec's (1994) college
scenario, which we altered in several ways to clarify the finality of the
decision and especially the long-lasting impact of the outcome:
John and Paul do not known each other, but both are enrolled at the
same elite university. Both are only moderately satisfied where they
are and both are considering transferring to another prestigious uni-
versity. They are both told they must make their final decision before
the end of the year. Each agonizes over the decision, going back and
forth between thinking he is going to stay and thinking he will leave.
They ultimately make different decisions: John opts to stay where he
is, and Paul decides to transfer.
Suppose their decisions turn out badly for both of them: At the end of
the year, John is even more unhappy where he is and wishes he had
transferred, and Paul is even more unhappy at his new college and
wishes he had stayed where he was. However it is too late for either
of them to reverse his decision.
The good-outcome version continued with a different second paragraph as
follows:
Suppose their decisions turn out well for both of them: At the end of
the year, John is happier where he is and is glad he stayed where he
was, and Paul is happier at his new college and is glad he transferred.
Who do you think would feel better about his decision on learning that
it was the right one?
The participants' task was to tick the name of one of the individuals, John
or Paul, in response to a question at the end of the scenario. Participants in
the short-term conditions were asked the following question:
Who do you think would regret his decision more [feel better about
his decision] on learning it was a mistake [it was the right one]?
John Paul
Participants in the long-term conditions were asked the following question,
for the bad-outcome version:
As a result they both drop out of college and neither of them ever
secures a good job. Who do you think would regret his decision more
on looking back on it ten years later? John Paul
and for the good-outcome version:
They both do very well at college and secure good jobs after gradu-
ating. Who do you think would feel better about his decision looking
back on it ten years later? John Paul
Participants were given one of four versions of the scenarios at random.
Participants and procedure. The 190 participants were undergraduate
students from the University of Dublin, Trinity College. The 159 women
and 31 men, aged 16 to 54 years (mean age = 21), participated in the
experiment voluntarily. They were assigned at random to the short-term
bad-outcome condition (n = 46), long-term bad-outcome condition (n =
46), short-term good-outcome condition (n = 47), or the long-term good-
outcome condition (n = 51). They were tested in several groups. Partici-
pants were presented with a 2-page booklet that contained the scenario and
question on the first page, followed by a debriefing paragraph on the
second page. They were instructed to take their time reading the story and
to answer the question that followed. The participants worked at their own
pace and ticked their answers in the spaces provided on the sheet.
Results and Discussion
The results showed a temporal reversal for the agency effect for
bad outcomes: Participants mentally undid actions in the short-
term, bad-outcome scenario but inactions in the long-term, bad-
outcome scenario, replicating Gilovich and Medvec's (1994) re-
sults. However, the results showed no temporal reversal for the
agency effect for good outcomes: Participants mentally undid
actions in both the short-term, good-outcome and the long-term,
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As Table 2 shows, a majority of the participants (61%) who
received the short-term bad-outcome scenario indicated that the
actor Paul would feel more regret than the nonactor John (39%;
binomial z = 1-47, p < .10). In contrast, most of the participants
who received the long-term, bad-outcome version indicated that
the nonactor John would feel more regret (76%) than the actor Paul
(24%); binomial z = 3.54, p < .01). More participants judged that
the actor would feel more regret in the short-term scenario (61%)
than in the long-term scenario (24%), and this difference was
reliable ^(\,N = 92) = 12.86, p < .001. Thus, the experiment
replicated Gilovich and Medvec's (1994) finding of a reversal
from mentally undoing actions to mentally undoing inactions over
time for bad outcomes.
As Table 2 also shows, this reversal did not occur for good
outcomes. Most participants who received the short-term, good-
outcome version indicated that the actor Paul would feel better
about his decision (70%) rather than the nonactor John (30%;
binomial z = 2.80, p < .01). Likewise, most participants who
received the long-term, good-outcome version indicated that the
actor Paul would feel better about his decision (75%) rather than
the nonactor John (25%; binomial z = 3.50, p < .01). There was
no difference between judgments that the actor Paul would feel
better in the short-term scenario (70%) than in the long-term
scenario (75%), ^(l, N = 98) = 0.23, p > .10 (and the compar-
ison had sufficient power at the 80% level to detect a difference of
25%).
The results showed that for bad outcomes, there was a temporal
pattern to the agency effect for the college scenario with its
unknown and possibly better counterfactual consequences for the
inaction: Participants mentally undid actions from the short-term
perspective and inactions from the long-term perspective. But for
good outcomes, there was no temporal pattern to the agency effect,
even for the college scenario, when the counterfactual conse-
quences for the inaction were unknown but possibly worse: Par-
ticipants mentally undid actions from both the short-term and
long-term perspectives.
Perhaps the wording of the long-term scenarios led participants
to consider that the consequences of the bad outcome were entirely
known, whereas the consequences of the good outcome were less
known? The long-term, bad-outcome scenario contained the infor-
mation, "Neither of them ever secures a good job," whereas the
long-term, good-outcome scenario contained the information,
"They both .. . secure good jobs after graduating;" it remains
Table 2
Percentages of Judgments of Greater Emotion for Actions and
Inactions in the Short and Long Terms for College Scenarios
With Good and Bad Outcomes
Long term
24
76
46
75
25
51
Outcome
Bad outcome
Action
Inaction
n
Good outcome
Action
Inaction
n
Short term
61
39
46
70
30
47
unknown whether they lost their jobs in the intervening 10 years,
stayed in them, or got better ones. But this possible difference in
the scenarios is unlikely to explain the results of the experiment. In
fact, it erroneously predicts a temporal reversal for good outcomes:
If the counterfactual consequences for the inaction were even more
unknown for the good-outcome scenario than the bad-outcome
scenario, then there should have been an even greater reversal of
the agency effect for the good-outcome scenario.
Perhaps the wording of the scenarios differed in how explicit
they made the counterfactual alternatives? In the good-outcome
versions, the wording alluded only to the factual situation:
John is happier where he is and is glad he stayed where he was, and
Paul is happier at his new college and is glad he transferred,
whereas for the bad-outcome scenarios, the wording provided an
explicit counterfactual scenario:
John is even more unhappy where he is and wishes he had transferred,
and Paul is even more unhappy at his new college and wishes he had
staved where he was.
An explicit counterfactual scenario enhances the emphasis on
actions, at least for good outcomes (Gleicher et al., 1990). We
ruled out any alternative explanations of our results on the basis of
differences in wording in the two scenarios in a further experiment.
We gave 257 participants good-outcome scenarios from short-term
and long-term perspectives, similar to the ones used in this exper-
iment, and we compared them with good-outcome, short- and
long-term scenarios that contained explicit counterfactual word-
ing:
John is happier where he is and is glad he had not transferred, and Paul
is happier at his new college and is glad he had not stayed where he
was.
The results showed that the explicit counterfactual wording
yielded the same pattern of results as the scenario with no explicit
counterfactual wording: Participants mentally undid the action
more than the inaction in the short term (explicit counterfactual,
84% vs. 16%; no explicit counterfactual, 68% vs. 32%) and in the
long term (explicit counterfactual, 88% vs. 12%; no explicit coun-
terfactual, 73% vs. 27%). If anything, the explicit counterfactual
accentuated the results rather than diminished them (see Byrne &
Gillanders, 1999).
The experiment showed that the temporal reversal for the
agency effect was confined not only to situations with the structure
of the college scenario but more specifically only to such situations
when they lead to a bad outcome. Our account proposes that
people undo actions because they are mentally represented in an
explicit way; they switch to undoing inactions when they consider
the consequences of the events and discover that, whereas the real
consequences of the action and the counterfactual consequences of
the mentally undone action are known and the same, the real
consequences of the inaction are known but the counterfactual
consequences of the mentally undone inaction are unknown and
are possibly better than the real consequences. If the unknown
counterfactual consequences of the mentally undone inaction are
unknown but are possibly worse than the real consequences, as
they are in the good-outcome scenarios, there is no switch to a
focus on inactions. The results support our suggestion that theCOUNTERFACTUAL THINKING 1325
reversal depends on the counterfactual consequences of the inac-
tion being unknown and possibly better.
Alternative explanations of the failure to find a temporal pattern
to the agency effect in the investment scenario hinge on identifying
other differences between the investment and college scenarios as
critical to the effect, and we turn now to examine one such
alternative explanation.
Experiment 3: Temporal Perspectives on Investments
That Go Bad From the Outset
The temporal pattern to the agency effect occurs only for sce-
narios in which the counterfactual consequences for the inaction
are unknown and possibly better than the real consequences. There
is no temporal pattern to the agency effect for scenarios in which
the counterfactual consequences of the inaction are known (the
investment scenarios) or in which the counterfactual consequences
of the inaction are unknown but are possibly worse than the real
consequences (the good-outcome college scenarios). Are there any
alternative explanations for the observation of a temporal reversal
for the college scenario but not for the investment scenario? One
possible difference between the two sorts of scenarios is that the
college scenario is bad from the outset: Both individuals are
unhappy in their college, hi contrast, the investment scenario is
neutral at the outset: No information is given about whether the
individuals are happy with their investments. Perhaps participants'
judgments about emotional impact depend in part on their view of
whether the protagonists were in an unhappy situation to start
with? Someone who is unhappy and does nothing about it may be
judged to feel worse about their inaction over time than someone
who is unhappy and tries to change their state, even if they do not
succeed (e.g., Zeelenberg, 1996). The increased emotional impact
of inactions over time may depend on the unhappy starting point of
the protagonists' situations. In this experiment, we tested this
alternative explanation.
We constructed an investment scenario that had a bad outset:
Both individuals' share values have fallen. Instead of the following
neutral outset in the original investment scenario:
During his first year as a shareholder in Company A/B there was a
once-ofT offer to switch to shares in Company B/A, but he decided
against it/and he decided to do so
we provided a bad outset:
During his first year as a shareholder in Company A/B the value of his
shares fell considerably until they were worth only £1,000. Around
that time there was a once-ofT offer to switch to shares in Company
B/A, but he decided against it/and he decided to do so.
If the bad outset leads people to believe with hindsight (i.e., in the
longer term) that the nonactor should have tried to do something to
change his bad situation, then there should be a temporal pattern to
the agency effect for this bad-outset scenario: Participants should
switch from a focus on actions in the short term to a focus on
inactions in the long term. The experiment was otherwise similar
to the first one and compared who would feel worse and who
would think "if only" most from the short-term and long-term
perspectives.
Method
Materials and design. We constructed short-term and long-term ver-
sions of the scenario used in Experiment 1 that were similar to the
scenarios described earlier except that they had a bad outset:
Paul saved hard and had £2,000 to invest. He bought shares in
Company A. During his first year as a shareholder in Company A the
value of his shares fell considerably until they were worth only
£ 1,000. Around that time there was a once-off offer to switch to shares
in Company B, but he decided against it. At the end of the first year
he found out diat he would have been better off by £5,000 if he had
taken the offer and switched to shares in Company B. [After 10 years,
he found out that his shares did not make up the lost ground in the
meantime, and he would still have been better off by £5,000 if he had
switched to shares in Company B.]
Joe also saved hard and had £2,000 to invest. He bought shares in
Company B. During his first year as a shareholder in Company B the
value of his shares fell considerably until they were worth only
£ 1,000. Around that time there was a once-off offer to switch to shares
in Company A, and he decided to do so. At the end of the first year
he too found out that he would have been better off by £5,000 if he
had turned down the offer and kept his shares in Company B.
[After 10 years, he found out that his shares did not make up the lost
ground in the meantime, and he would still have been better off by
£5,000 if he had kept his shares in Company B.]
The participants were asked three questions about who would think if only
most often, how the thought would be completed, and who would feel
worse. We gave the short-term scenario to one group of participants and the
long-term scenario to a second group.
Participants and procedure. The 131 participants were undergraduate
students from different departments at the University of Dublin, Trinity
College. The 65 women and 66 men, aged 18 to 50 years (Af age = 24
years), participated in the experiment voluntarily and were assigned at
random to one of two groups. Thirty participants were eliminated before
any data analysis because they failed to complete all three questions. The
remaining 101 participants completed all three questions for either the
short-term (n = 50) or long-term scenario (n = 51). They were tested in
several groups and presented with a booklet that contained the instructions,
the scenario and questions, and a debriefing paragraph, each on separate
pages. The participants worked at their own pace and provided their
answers in the spaces on the sheet.
Results and Discussion
The results showed that people judged greater emotional impact
and greater frequency of counterfactual thoughts for actions in the
short term and in the long term, even when the starting point was
bad. From the short-term perspective, people judged that the actor
Joe (70%) would feel worse than the nonactor, Paul (30%), and the
difference was reliable (binomial z = 2.69, p < .004). Likewise,
from the long-term perspective, people judged that the actor Joe
(76%) would feel worse than the nonactor Paul (24%), and the
difference was again reliable (binomial z = 3.64, p < .0002).
There was no difference in the short-term and long-term conditions
in the judgments that the actor would feel worse (70% vs. 76%),
^(1, N = 101) = 0.46, p > .54, as Table 3 shows (and the
comparison had sufficient power at the 80% level to detect a
difference of 25% or more).
Exactly the same pattern emerged for their judgments about who
would think "if only" most often. From the short-term perspective,
people judged that the actor Joe (62%) would think "if only" more1326 BYRNE AND McELENEY
Table 3
Percentages of Judgments of Who Feels Worse and Who Thinks
"If Only" Most Often for Actions and Inactions in the Short-
and Long-Terms for Scenarios With Bad Initial States
Question
Who feels worse?
Action
Inaction
Who thinks "if only" most often?
Action
Inaction
n
Short term
70
30
62
38
50
Long term
76
24
61
39
51
often than the nonactor Paul (38%), and the difference was reliable
(binomial z = 1.56, p < .059). Likewise from the long-term
perspective, people judged that the actor Joe (61%) would think "if
only" more often than the nonactor Paul (39%), and the difference
was reliable, although somewhat marginal (binomial z = 1-40, p <
.08). There was no difference in the short-term and long-term
conditions in the judgments that the actor would think "if only"
most (62% vs. 61%), ^(1, N = 101) = 0.02, p > .90, as Table 3
also shows (and the comparison had sufficient power at the 80%
level to detect a difference of 27% or more).
People completed the counterfactual thought by undoing the
individual's action or inaction (depending on whether they focused
on the actor or the nonactor) in 62% of cases for the short-term
scenario and 16% of mutations were general ones (e.g., "I wish I'd
taken a chance"). The remaining 22% of completions were non-
counterfactual thoughts. None of the undoings focused on the
consequences (e.g., "I wish I hadn't lost the money"). Likewise,
from the long-term perspective, people completed the thought by
undoing the individual's action or inaction in 63% of cases, and
8% of mutations were general. The remaining 29% were non-
counterfactual thoughts. Once again, none of the undoings focused
on the consequences.
The results show that people mentally undo actions more than
inactions from both a long-term and a short-term perspective, even
when the information from the outset is bad in the investment
scenario, as it was in the college scenario. Of course, it could be
argued that a fall in share prices is not as emotionally involving as
unhappiness in college, and so the bad initial state is not equivalent
in the two sorts of scenarios. Bad investment performance may not
be as predictive of future unhappiness as bad college performance.
Nonetheless, the findings suggest that the temporal pattern to the
agency effect for the college scenario is not the result of its bad
outset. The results provide some support for our contention that the
crucial difference between the college and investment scenarios
lies elsewhere. In the next experiment, we turned from an exam-
ination of the bad outset of the scenarios to an examination of the
bad outcomes of the scenarios.
Experiment 4: Investments That Are Equally Bad
for Actors and Nonactors
We showed that people mentally undid actions even in the long
term not only in an investment scenario but also in a college
scenario with a good outcome and an investment scenario with a
bad outset. The participants switched to mentally undoing inac-
tions from a long-term perspective in situations where the coun-
terfactual consequences from the mentally undone inaction but not
the mentally undone action were unknown and possibly better than
the real consequences. In all other situations, they mentally undid
actions. Our suggestion is that people mentally undo actions be-
cause actions are represented explicitly. An alternative explanation
for the focus on actions highlights the difference in the subjective
outcomes for the actor and the nonactor. In our final experiment,
we tested this alternative explanation.
Experiments on the agency effect have relied on scenarios in
which the same outcome occurs for the actor and the nonactor
(e.g., Gilovich & Medvec, 1994; Gleicher et al., 1990; Kahneman
& Tversky, 1982; Landman, 1987). For example, in the investment
scenario, a bad outcome (a monetary loss) occurs for both the actor
and the nonactor. The outcome is objectively the same for both
protagonists, but subjectively it may be subtly different for each
one. The bad outcome for the actor results in the presence of a bad
consequence, whereas the bad outcome for the nonactor results in
the absence of a good consequence; in other words, something bad
happens to the actor, whereas something good fails to happen to
the nonactor. In the investment scenario, the actor loses money,
whereas the nonactor fails to gain money. This subtle difference
may lead participants to infer that the actor is in a worse state
factually than he was at the outset, whereas the nonactor is in the
same neutral state as he was at the outset. This inference may
underlie participants' focus on actions and their judgments that
actions lead to greater emotional impact and greater frequency of
counterfactual thoughts.
We attempted to counter any such inference by ensuring that the
outcome was described explicitly as exactly the same for both the
actor and the nonactor. In the original investment scenario used in
the first experiment, we gave participants the following sort of
information for both the actor and the nonactor:
Paul/Joe saved hard and had £2,000 to invest At the end of the
first year he found out that he would have been better off by £1,000
if he had taken the offer and switched to shares in Company B/if he
had turned down the offer and kept his shares in Company B.
In a second scenario, we replaced this sentence with one intended
to make the exact nature of the loss more explicit for both the actor
and the nonactor:
Paul/Joe saved hard and had £2,000 to invest.... At the end of the
first year he found out that his shares had fallen to a value of just
£1,000 in Company A and they would have risen to a value of £3,000
if he had taken the offer and switched to shares in Company Bfif he
had turned down the offer and kept his shares in Company B.
In this explicit-loss version, it is clear for both the actor and the
nonactor that the factual situation for each one is that they have
lost £1,000 (from a £2,000 investment, their shares have fallen to
£1,000), and the counterfactual alternative for each one is that they
could have gained £1,000 (from a £2,000 investment their shares
would have risen to £3,000). The focus on actions should be
eliminated in the new explicit-loss scenario if participants mentally
undo actions because they infer that the subjective outcome from
the action has led the actor to be in a worse state than when he
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whereas the inaction has led the nonactor to be in the same state as
when he started—that is, something good fails to happen to the
nonactor.
Method
Materials and design. We constructed a new version of the original
investment scenario used in the first experiment, which specified the nature
of the outcome more explicitly for both individuals. The new explicit-loss
scenario was as follows:
Paul saved hard and had £2,000 to invest. He bought shares in
Company A. During his first year as a shareholder in Company A
there was a once-off offer to switch to shares in Company B, but he
decided against it. At the end of the first year he found out that his
shares had fallen to a value of just £1,000 in Company A and they
would have risen to a value of £3,000 if he had taken the offer and
switched to shares in Company B.
Joe also saved hard and had £2,000 to invest. He bought shares in
Company B. During his first year as a shareholder in Company B
there was a once-off offer to switch to shares in Company A, and he
decided to do so. At the end of the first year he found out that his
shares had fallen to a value of just £1,000 in Company A and they
would have risen to a value of £3,000 if he had turned down the offer
and kept his shares in Company B.
The original scenario was the same as the one in the first experiment
(except that participants were told the protagonists would have been better
off by £3,000, not £5,000). The participants again were asked three
questions about who would think "if only" most often, how the thought
would be completed, and who would feel worse. We gave the original
scenario to one group of participants and the explicit-loss version to a
second group.
Participants and procedure. The 113 participants were undergraduate
students from different departments in the University of Dublin, Trinity
College. The 39 women and 74 men, aged 17 to 48 years (M age - 22
years), participated in the experiment voluntarily, and they were assigned
at random to one of the two groups. Nine participants were eliminated prior
to any data analysis because they failed to complete all three questions. The
remaining 104 participants completed all three questions for the original
scenario or the explicit-loss scenario (n = 52 in each). They were tested in
several groups. They were presented with a booklet that contained the
instructions, the scenario and questions, and a debriefing paragraph, each
on separate pages. The participants worked at their own pace and provided
their answers in the spaces on the sheet.
Results and Discussion
The results showed that participants mentally undid actions in
both the original scenario and the explicit-loss scenario, in terms of
judgments of greater emotional impact and greater frequency of
counterfactual thoughts. For the original scenario, people judged
that the actor Joe (75%) would feel worse than the nonactor Paul
(25%), and the difference was reliable (binomial z = 3.47, p <
.003). Likewise, for the explicit-loss scenario, people judged that
the actor Joe (94%) would feel worse than the nonactor Paul (6%),
and the difference was again reliable (binomial z = 6.24, p <
.00005). In fact, people mentally undid actions rather than inac-
tions even more in the explicit-loss scenario than the original (94%
vs. 75%), x\l,N= 104) = 7.39, p > .006, as Table 4 shows.
A somewhat similar pattern emerged for participants' judgments
about who would think "if only" most often. For the original
scenario, people judged that the actor Joe (67%) would think "if
Table 4
Percentages of Judgments of Who Feels Worse and Who Thinks
"If Only" Most Often for Actions and Inactions in Scenarios
With Explicit-Loss Outcomes
Question
Who feels worse?
Action
Inaction
Who thinks "if only" most often?
Action
Inaction
n
Original
75
25
67
33
52
Explicit loss
94
6
54
46
52
only" more often than the nonactor Paul (33%), and the difference
was reliable (binomial z = 2.38, p < .009). For the explicit-loss
scenario, people judged that the actor Joe (54%) would think "if
only" somewhat more often than the nonactor Paul (46%), but the
8% difference between them was not reliable (binomial z — 0.42,
p < .39). Nonetheless, the difference was in the predicted direc-
tion, and, most important, there was no difference in the original
and explicit-loss scenarios in the judgments that the actor would
think "if only" most (67% vs. 54%) ^(1, N = 104) = 1.97, p >
.16, as Table 4 also shows (and the comparison had sufficient
power at the 80% level to detect a difference of 27%).
People completed the counterfactual thought by undoing the
individual's action or inaction (depending on whether they focused
on the actor or the nonactor) in 52% of cases for the original
scenario. Eight percent of mutations were general (e.g., "I wish I'd
taken a chance"), and 2% focused on the consequences. The
remaining 38% of completions were noncounterfactual thoughts.
Likewise, for the explicit-loss scenario, people completed the
thought by undoing the individual's action or inaction in 57% of
cases. Six percent of mutations were general and 8% focused on
the consequences. The remaining 29% were noncounterfactual
thoughts.
The results showed that people mentally undid actions more
than inactions for both the original and the explicit-loss scenario.
The results suggest that the pervasive focus on actions in the
investment scenario did not arise because people inferred that the
actor was in a worse state than he was at the outset, whereas the
nonactor was in the same state as at the outset. Even when it was
made clear that the actor and the nonactor were in an equally worse
state than at the outset, participants mentally undid the action more
than the inaction. The experiment rules out the alternative expla-
nation of the agency effect.
General Discussion
The results of our experiments show that the temporal pattern to
the agency effect occurs only under very specialized circum-
stances. People mentally undo inactions from the long-term per-
spective only when the imagined consequences of the mentally
undone inaction are unknown and possibly better than the real
consequences of the inaction (whereas the imagined consequences
for the mentally undone action are known and the same as the real
consequences). In all other situations that we have examined,
people mentally undid actions. They mentally undid actions even
from the long-term perspective when the imagined consequences1328 BYRNE AND McELENEY
for the mentally undone inaction and action were both known and
the same (as in the investment scenario in the first experiment) or
when the imagined consequences were unknown but not better
than the real consequences fas in the college scenario with good
outcomes in the second experiment). This pervasive focus on
actions in the investment scenario does not seem to arise simply
because the initial state for the actor and nonactor is neutral rather
than bad, as in the college scenario, and the third experiment ruled
out this alternative explanation. This focus also does not seem to
arise simply because the subjective outcome seems worse for the
actor than the nonactor, and the fourth experiment ruled out this
alternative explanation. People mentally undo actions for both bad
and good outcomes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Landman,
1987), for scenarios that contain explicit counterfactuals and fac-
tual descriptions (Gleicher et al., 1990), and in a variety of real-life
situations (e.g., Davis et al., 1995; Gilovich & Medvec, 1994;
Gilovich, Medvec, & Chen, 1995).
Our explanation of the agency effect hinges on two simple
principles: First, actions are more readily mutated because they are
represented explicitly. We propose that actions are represented
more explicitly than inactions, by keeping in mind more situations
in a mental representation of the events. As a result of the greater
amount of information kept in mind about them, actions are more
readily available for mutation in the generation of a counterfactual
alternative. From a short-term perspective, people mentally undo
actions because their mutations are guided by what is represented
exphcitly (Byrne, 1997).
Second, inactions are more readily mutated from the long-term
perspective only when their counterfactual consequences are pos-
sibly better than their real consequences (and the action's coun-
terfactual consequences are not). We propose that people can
revise their mental representations of events to make additional
information explicit. The task of judging who will feel worse and
who will think "if only" most about their situation from a long-
term perspective requires a consideration of the real and imagined
consequences of the events. Actions are more available for muta-
tion if the real and imagined consequences are known for both the
actor and the nonactor (as they are in the investment scenario).
Actions are more mutable even if the imagined consequences are
unknown for the nonactor, once none of the imagined possibilities
are better than the real consequences (as in the good-outcome
college scenario). However, a reversal to a focus on inactions
occurs in a situation, such as the bad-outcome college scenario, in
which the real and imagined consequences for the actor are known
but only the real consequences are known for the nonactor, and the
unknown imagined consequences may possibly be good, that is,
better than the real ones for the nonactor. The disparity between
the action and inaction in this regard only comes to light from a
long-term perspective from which people consider the conse-
quences of events; from a short-term perspective the disparity
remains hidden because people focus just on what is explicitly
represented in their initial representation of the events. Our ac-
count seems to capture most, but of course not all, of the partici-
pants responses: A minority of participants, typically up to one
third, perform differently from the majority in these tasks. We turn
now to a putative sketch of the cognitive processes underlying
such a proposal.
Mental Models and the Agency Effect
We suggest that people mentally represent assertions about
actions and inactions in different ways by constructing mental
models—that is, mental representations of the way the world
would be if the assertions were true (Johnson-Laird, 1983). Ac-
tions are mentally represented as two separate alternatives: the
preaction state of the actor and their postaction state as shown in
the following example:
George Current
Past
Company A
Company B
where the diagram uses Company A to represent "George has
stock in Company A." Separate models are represented on separate
lines, and the models are annotated to keep track of their chrono-
logical temporal status (see Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken,
1992; Schaeken, Johnson-Laird, & d'Ydewalle, 1996). Inactions
can be represented more economically by a single mental model:
The past state and current state are the same, as follows (Byrne,
1997; Byrne & McEleney, 1997):
Paul Current and past Company A
Evidence for such models comes from studies of conditionals, such
as the following:
If George kept his stock in Company B, then it earned $1,200.
A fully explicit set of models represents the three separate situa-
tions that capture the way the world would be if the conditional
were true (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991):
Company B $1,200
Not Company B not $1,200
Not Company B $1,200
The diagram uses $1,200 to represent "It earned $1,200," and
"not" is a propositional-like tag to represent negation (see
Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992). However, reasoners
construct an initial representation that is more economical than the
fleshed-out set, because of the limitations of working memory:
Company B $1,200
where the three dots represent a model with no explicit content,
which captures the idea that alternatives exist that have not been
mentally articulated. The models may be "fleshed-out" to be more
explicit if necessary (for other details, including a description of
the computer program to simulate the theory, see Johnson-Laird &
Byrne, 1991, and for recent empirical corroborations, see Byrne,
Espino, & Santamaria, 1999; Byrne & Handley, 1997). For exam-
ple, consider a counterfactual conditional as follows:
If George had kept his stock in Company B, then he would have been
better off by $1,200.
This requires reasoners to represent the information hypothesized,
and also the presupposed factual situation:
Factual
Counterfactual
Nor Company B
Company B
Not SI,200
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As a result of keeping in mind the more explicit representation of
the two situations, there are systematic differences in the infer-
ences people make from factual and counterfactual conditionals
(Byrne & Tasso, 1999).
The construction of a counterfactual scenario may be con-
strained by what is explicitly represented in the initial mental
representation (e.g., Byrne, 1997; Legrenzi, Girotto, & Johnson-
Laird, 1993). Accordingly, it may be easier to construct a coun-
terfactual scenario on the basis of the mental representation of an
action; for an inaction, the single economical representation of the
current state provides less material from which to construct the
alternative possibilities. The longer perspective requires a consid-
eration of the consequences of events (Kahneman, 1995). As a
result, people must flesh out their models to be more explicit and
to represent explicitly the real and imagined consequences of the
actions and inactions. For the investment scenario, the fleshed out
models may include the following sort of information:
George
Paul
An inspection of the set of models shows clearly that each pro-
tagonist would have been better off by exactly the same amount
had they done things differently. The college scenario is repre-
sented in a similar set of models from the short term perspective:
Factual
Counterfactual
Factual
Counterfactual
Company A
Company B
Company A
Company B
not $1,200
$1,200
not $1,200
$1,200
Paul
John
Factual
Counterfactual
Factual
College B
College A
College A
Even more unhappy
Moderately satisfied
Even more unhappy
However, an inspection of the fleshed-out set of models for the
college scenario reveals the inequity in information about the
counterfactual consequences for the actor and nonactor:
Paul
John
Factual
Counterfactual
Factual
Counterfactual
College B
College A
College A
College B
Even more unhappy
Moderately satisfied
Even more unhappy
Unknown
Reasoners may generate alternative counterfactual possibilities for
John:
John
When the outcome of the scenario is good, the counterfactual
consequences are unknown for the nonactor but might be worse
than the real consequences:
Factual
Counterfactual
Counterfactual
College A
College B
College B
Even more unhappy
Unhappy
Happy
Paul
John
Factual
Counterfactual
Factual
Counterfactual
Counterfactual
College B
College A
College A
College B
College B
Happy
Moderately satisfied
Happy
Unhappy
Happy
This account is a preliminary sketch of a theory of counterfactual
mutability. It is necessarily tentative, is based on already existing
data, and requires empirical test.
Alternative Explanations
We have attempted to sketch some of the cognitive factors that
may contribute to the mutability of actions. Motivational variables
may also be important, but the results of our experiments suggest
that motivational variables may not always play a central role.
Consider, for example, the seven mechanisms outlined by Gilovich
and Medvec (1995a), five motivational and two cognitive, that
may contribute to the temporal pattern of the focus on actions and
the reversal to a focus on inactions. The five motivational variables
should continue to operate to create a focus on inactions in the long
term for the investment scenario examined in the first experiment.
The three motivational mechanisms that reduce regret for ac-
tions—taking compensatory steps, looking for silver linings, and
engaging in more dissonance reduction—should apply equally to
the actor in the investment scenario as in the college scenario. Two
motivational mechanisms to increase regret for inactions also
apply equally to the investment scenario, the inaction may be
inexplicable because of an increase in retrospective confidence in
the action's success and the nonsalience of variables that inhibited
the action. These five motivational mechanisms predict a focus on
inactions in the long-term investment scenario and so they are
inconsistent with the results, for example, of the fust experiment.
The action effect in the long term was just as strong as the action
effect in the short term for the investment scenario in the first
experiment, which suggests that people judge that the actor and the
nonactor will not make their peace with their financial loss over
time (Kahneman, 1995). Instead cognitive mechanisms, in partic-
ular the unknown nature of the counterfactual consequences of
some inactions, bounded only by the limits of the imagination of
what might have been, may be critical (Gilovich & Medvec,
1995b; Kahneman, 1995).
For the good-outcome scenarios examined in the second exper-
iment, it is also not clear that a motivational explanation would
provide a viable account. For example, of the seven mechanisms
that Gilovich and Medvec (1995a) outlined, the first three, which
reduce the emotional impact of regrettable actions, do not apply to
feeling better about actions: There is no need to engage in com-
pensation, silver linings, or dissonance. Hence, no reversal of an
action effect to an inaction effect over time would be expected for
good outcomes. But, two motivational factors do apply to the
good-outcome scenarios: Emotions for inactions may be enhanced
by their inexplicability because of retrospective confidence, and
inhibitory factors may be less accessible. Moreover, the cognitive
factors also apply to the good-outcome scenarios: Inactions may be
more available because they are open-ended (their consequences
are unknown) and thus memorable, and their counterfactual con-
sequences are potentially infinite. Hence, at the very least, this
account would predict a reduction, even a reversal of the focus on
actions over time for good outcomes. The results of the second
experiment show that such a reversal does not occur and so they
are difficult for the motivational account to explain. The results of
the four experiments reported here suggest that cognitive variables
are centrally important in an explanation of the mutability of
actions.1330 BYRNE AND McELENEY
Conclusions
Our experiments showed that the temporal pattern to the agency
effect occurs only in a limited set of circumstances. The experi-
ments showed no temporal pattern to the agency effect when the
counterfactual consequences from the mentally undone inaction
were known, no temporal pattern even when the counterfactual
consequences from the mentally undone inaction were unknown
once the outcome of the situation was good, no temporal pattern
even when the situation for both the actor and the nonactor was
specified to be bad from the outset, and a continued focus on
actions even when the nature of the loss was specified to be equal
for both the actor and the nonactor.
In real life, the counterfactual consequences from people's in-
actions are sometimes knowable, for example, in situations where
the outcome depends largely on external factors such as the suc-
cess of the stock exchange; sometimes the consequences are un-
knowable, for example, in situations where the outcome depends
largely on internal factors such as the success of an individual's
adjustment to college. Our experiments suggest that it is only in
situations where the counterfactual consequences of mentally un-
done inactions are unknown—and possibly better than the factual
consequences—that there is a temporal pattern to the agency
effect. Our results show that where the counterfactual conse-
quences of mentally undone actions and inactions are both known
and similar, there is no temporal pattern to the agency effect:
People judge that actions elicit most emotion and most counter-
factual thought generation from both a short-term and a long-term
perspective.
We have suggested that the action effect can be explained with
reference to the nature of the mental representations that people
construct of factual situations. People represent actions more ex-
plicitly than inactions, and they can flesh out their representation
to be more explicit if need be to consider the counterfactual
consequences of mentally undone actions and inactions. Our ac-
count relates the cognitive processes underlying the construction
of counterfactual scenarios to the cognitive processes that underlie
other aspects of high-level cognition, including deductive reason-
ing (Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991) and naive judgments of prob-
ability (Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Sonino Legrenzi, &
Caverni, 1999). It suggests that the mutability of actions and
inactions depends crucially on differences in the way in which they
are mentally represented.
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